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lobal imbalances have continued,indeed deep-
ened, far longer than both researchers and
pundits would have thought.On the US side,the cur-
rent account deficit at about $666 billion (2004) and
6.1 percent of GDP falls outside the oft-quoted
range of 4 to 5 percent after which, research on in-
dustrial countries suggests, economic forces tend to
narrow the imbalance. There is somewhat less
research on the persistence of global imbalances
from the standpoint of the rest of the world, in part
because individually most of those imbalances are
not so notable.Clearly though,collectively growth in
the rest of the world has come to be co-dependent
on US demand patterns.
Three frameworks for analysis
There are several frameworks to analyze these
imbalances. The first framework analyzes the exter-
nal imbalances from the standpoint of export and
import flows. Second, underlying the external imbal-
ances are internal imbalances in both countries and
regions with respect to savings and investment, that
is, domestic demand and production. Third, these
real-side imbalances are reflected in the composition
and distribution of financial portfolios of assets and
supported through exchange rate regimes. Thus
there are three frameworks in which to analyze glob-
al imbalances: the international framework (trade
and current account imbalances); the domestic
framework (savings vs. investment and domestic
demand vs.production);and the financial framework
(investor choice over portfolios of assets).
Regardless of the exact point where economic forces
push back hard, few suggest that the trajectories for
the US imbalances (international, domestic, and
financial) are sustainable, although which of the tra-
jectories bites first is open to contention. And nei-
ther is the collective path for the rest-of-the-world.
That no other country faces as significant a quantita-
tive change to their trade balance as the United
States should not imply ease of adjustment. In fact,
just the opposite could be the case as each country,
facing the policy choices and structural challenges to
reorienting demand, production, and financing,
could argue that someone else should ‘go first’.
In fact,beginning in 2002,the dollar started to depre-
ciate, most notably against the euro, in effect forcing
the Euro-area countries to start the process of
adjustment of global trade and domestic demand.
However, for a second block of currencies in Asia,
currency market forces are more muted. For them, a
coordinated action to allow internal and external
adjustment may be necessary to break-up the global
co-dependency and return global growth to a more
balanced footing.
In sum,the collective co-dependency between the US
and the rest-of-the world has enabled the internation-
al,domestic,and financial global imbalances to persist
longer than they otherwise would have.Although the
dollar began a generalized depreciation in 2002, sug-
gestive that a break-up of the global co-dependents
was underway,the distribution of the depreciation has
been uneven in ways consistent with macroeconomic
frameworks of analysis. Breaking-up is hard to do,
particularly if that involves collective action on the
part of some policy markers.
Global imbalance from the perspective of the 
international framework 
The US current account is driven predominantly by
trade in goods and services, which in turn is largely
determined by US and foreign income growth,along
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is the largest 
category on both
sides of the trade
equation
with relative prices.With respect to growth differen-
tials, movements in the US trade balance have been
influenced largely by the degree to which the US and
foreign economic cycles are out of sync. In the early
1980s, and again in the early 1990s, the US economy
slipped into recession and imports slowed. During
those cycles, world growth remained relatively
robust, so US exports rose. The trade deficit nar-
rowed from both the import and the export side.
During the mid-and late 1990s, the US current
account widened as relatively anemic consumption
and particularly investment growth in Japan, Europe
and other markets around the world dampened
demand for US exports while US consumption and
investment grew at unprecedented rates and drew in
imports. Since the 2001 downturn, US growth has
rebounded more quickly than did growth in the rest
of the world.Moreover,until sev-
eral years ago, not only did
growth differentials support a
widening US external deficit, but
also relative prices (as proxied by
the real exchange value of the
dollar) tended to augment the
deficit by making imports cheap-
er and exports more expensive.
Consequently, the US trade and
current account deficits have
widened into unprecedented ter-
ritory,both in dollar terms and as
a share of GDP (Fig. 1) 
The macro picture of the US
trade deficit masks important
features of the disaggregated
data, which may be particularly
important for the advent and
resolution of global co-depen-
dency (Fig. 2). The largest cate-
gory on both sides of the US
trade equation is capital goods
and industrial supplies and
materials excluding energy,
which accounted for 45 percent
of exports and 32 percent of
imports (2004). Up until 1997,
net trade cycled through larger
and smaller surpluses depending
in large part on the US and glob-
al business cycles. Since about
that time,however,the trade bal-
ance in this category has not
recovered even as global growth
has revived. From a surplus of about $50 billion in
1997, this balance is now in deficit to the tune of
some $50 billion. This change may reflect the initial
and continued effects of the appreciation of the dol-
lar.It may be due to relatively slow growth of invest-
ment in US exporters’ markets abroad, which has
been masked by more robust aggregated measures
of economic activity such as GDP.Given the share of
exports, tepid investment abroad would weigh more
heavily on US exports of capital goods than on US
trade overall. Or, there may have been a permanent
change in the international supply chain for the pro-
duction of capital goods,perhaps to center on China.
Or,the fallout from the Asian financial crises may be
persisting.
On the other hand, US ‘other private services’ such
as education, finance, and business and professional
Figure 1
Figure 2services continue to reveal inter-
national competitiveness. The
balance on trade in this category
of trade (which now accounts
for 6 percent of total imports
and 13 percent of total exports)
is positive and has continued to
rise despite slow growth abroad.
This is particularly impressive
given that empirical analysis of
the income elasticity of trade in
services indicates that sluggish growth abroad dis-
proportionately tends to hold down exports of these
services.
Although capital goods and services may be the
biggest categories of trade flows, the biggest com-
ponent of the non-oil/non-agriculture trade
deficit is in consumer goods, which account for 21
percent of imports and 8 percent of exports.When
added to the net deficit in autos, nearly three-
quarters of the increase in the non-oil/non-agri-
culture trade deficit since 1997 can be accounted
for by these two categories of personal consump-
tion expenditures. Moreover, only outright reces-
sion (in 1991 and 2001) stemmed the widening in
these components of net trade. For some goods
(such as apparel, shoes, and computer peripher-
als) a story of lost comparative advantage is plau-
sible.But,for the full range of consumer and auto-
motive products it does not seem to square with
the historical comparative advantage in manufac-
tured capital goods.
Overall, US trade evidences the empirical regularity
that US imports grow relatively
faster when US GDP grows as
compared to how much US
exports grow when foreign GDP
grows.This empirical finding has
several potential foundations
ranging from the level of eco-
nomic development in the Unit-
ed States vs. other countries, to
love of variety of goods (includ-
ing of imports from home by
immigrants), to trade protection
(particularly in services activi-
ties), to importance of scale in
production. In addition, the very
large structural imbalances in
the consumer categories of trade
may be a reflection of domestic
imbalance in the United States, to which we turn in
the next section.
For the rest of the world, what does the internation-
al framework for analyzing global imbalances tell
us? Considering a 25-year horizon,some regions and
countries tend toward persistent current account
surplus (Japan) and some tend toward deficit (Latin
America and Caribbean and Australia and Canada).
However, during the 1990s, almost all countries
moved toward current account surplus,in some cases
dramatically so (Latin American and Caribbean,
non-Japan Asia/Pacific, Western Europe, and
Canada).So,the widening of the US current account
deficit has a counterpart in narrowing deficits and
widening surpluses in other parts of the world
(Table). These rising surpluses do not necessarily
imply a co-dependency on the United States for
growth.
However, when countries’ global current accounts
are examined more narrowly through the lens of
bilateral trade with the United States, the depen-
dency on US markets is dramatic. Over all coun-
tries and regions, there are large, and in most cases






Current account balances as percentage of GDP, selected regions 
 1980  1985  1990  1998  2003  2004  2005p 
China 0.1  –  3.7  3.1  3.3  3.2  2.4  2.8 
Japan –  1  3.8  1.4  3  3.2  3.4  3.2 
Asia/Pacific  – 3  – 0.4  – 0.6  4.5  5  4.1  3.5 
Western 
Europe 
– 1.3  0.6  – 0.3  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.3 
Australia  – 2.7  – 5.1  – 5.2  – 5  – 5.9  – 5.3  – 4.9 
Source: IMF WEO, September 2004. 







took up the slack
increasing, trade surpluses vis-
à-vis the United States (Fig. 3).
The widening US trade imbal-
ance is not just due to imports
from China or Japan, but is
broad-based across all trading
partners. Indeed, the worsening
of the bilateral US trade bal-
ance vis-a-vis Western Europe
is of about the same dollar
magnitude as with China (1997
to 2004). (However, note the
different behavior of the bilat-
eral deficits for the recent quar-
ters of 2004 – with Western
Europe and Canada turning
toward balance and Japan lev-
eling off – an observation to
which we will return.) Hence, even as the global
current account imbalances of the rest-of-the-
world are individually relatively small, and hence
would not appear to warrant much policy atten-
tion, their dependence on the US market for the
bulk of the positive improvement in their global
current account is quite great and does warrant
policy consideration.
An alternative presentation of trade data puts
China at the center and shows that the region’s
growth success is still dependent on the US market.
Figure 4 suggests that China is a value-added way-
station for production ultimately destined for the
United States and to a lesser extent Western
Europe. To some degree the explosion in intra-
regional trade in Asia is not from ‘home grown’
demand, but rather still depends ultimately on
exporting to the US market.
Global imbalances from the perspective of the
domestic framework 
As is well known from national income and product
accounting, an external deficit has as its counterpart
an imbalance between savings and investment, or,
equivalently, between production and domestic
demand.How are the US current account deficit and
the rest-of-world current account surpluses reflected
in their domestic accounts? 
For the United States, Figure 5 shows a decomposi-
tion of the national income and product accounts
into the savings-investment balance, with the com-
ponents of net national savings
highlighted. During the 1990s,
the narrowing of the fiscal bud-
get, ultimately into surplus,
helped finance the increase in
investment of that period. In the
last several years the fiscal posi-
tion returned to deficit with
about half to two-thirds of the
increase in the deficit due to sig-
nificant tax cuts to individuals.
As investment rebounded, with
insufficient national savings, net
foreign savings (proxied by the
current account) increased. The
most notable structural feature
of the national accounts is how
private consumption in the
Figure 4
Figure 5United States has been robust
through periods of both fiscal
surplus and fiscal deficit; net
household savings has trended
downward almost without
pause.
Matching-up the domestic and
international perspectives for
the United States, the trending
down of household savings in
the domestic framework is
reflected in a persistent widen-
ing of the deficits in the con-
sumer goods and autos cate-
gories in the international
framework. Policy choices and
economic outcomes have augmented US consump-
tion capability, at various times through equity
wealth, housing wealth, and tax cuts.
For the rest of the world, the domestic framework
for analyzing the global imbalance considers the dif-
ference between growth in domestic demand and
growth in production. It is common to use growth in
GDP as the measure of global economic activity;and
this is correct when the objective is to measure glob-
al growth. However, when considering global imbal-
ances between the U.S.and the rest of the world,it is
important to net out the United States from the
global growth equation.Moreover,to the extent that
growth in GDP abroad is augmented by a positive
net export position, as has already been observed in
the systematic move toward current account surplus,
growth in foreign GDP will tend to exceed growth in
domestic demand. Finally, given the unbalanced
composition of US trade, with exports of capital
goods being five times more important than exports
of consumer goods, considering the break-down of
foreign domestic demand between consumption
growth and investment growth may be an important
link between the international framework and the
domestic framework for analyzing global imbal-
ances.
In fact, there was a systematic trend over the 1990s
in the relationship between domestic demand
growth and GDP growth for countries other than the
United States (Fig. 6). Whereas in the early 1990s,
non-US global GDP growth was less than non-US
domestic demand growth, by the end of the 1990s
and to 2003, foreign domestic demand growth fell
short of foreign GDP growth by more than 1 per-
centage point.This unbroken trend narrowing of the
gap between non-US global production and non-US
global domestic demand is the striking counterpart
to the widening US current account deficit and helps
explains the region-by-region net-export surpluses
with the United States.
Global imbalances from the perspective of the 
financial market framework
The third perspective on global imbalances is inter-
national financial flows. By the nature of balance of
payments accounting, a current account deficit
implies net financial inflows from the rest of the
world. For the United States, these financial inflows
have changed in both magnitude and composition in
recent years. Moreover, the extended period of US
current account deficits (more than 25 years) implies
a build-up of net financial obligations to the rest of
the world whose composition and geographic con-
centration also have changed.The concentration and
composition of financial portfolios in the United
States and abroad may affect the pace and nature of
the resolution of the global imbalances, particularly
with regard to the need for coordinated or collective
action by policymakers in Asia.
The US financial market offers a wide menu of
assets: US Treasury securities, corporate stocks and
bonds, direct ownership of a controlling interest in
companies or real estate (foreign direct investment),
even currency. The patterns and magnitudes of net
purchases of these assets reflect broad trends in the
financial marketplace. Foreign purchases of US
assets regularly exceed the ‘financing need’ based on
the US current account because US investors pur-
chase assets from abroad. For example for 2004
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(AR), the current account was $666 billion but the
financial inflow was $1433 billion. Equity purchases
were particularly notable during the stock-market
boom years, and the share of US assets in equity
portfolios abroad rose from 30 percent in 1993 to
about 50 percent at the end of 2004 (Economist mag-
azine ‘Portfolio Poll’). Private and official purchases
of US government securities resumed when the fis-
cal budget deficit reappeared and widened dramati-
cally, thus creating renewed net supply of these
assets. Indeed foreigners increased their share of US
Treasury securities held by the public from 20 per-
cent in 1990 to 30 percent in 2000 to about 55 percent
in 2004.
Foreign official purchases of US Treasury securities
have been particularly notable since 2002 when the
dollar started to depreciate.Foreign official purchas-
es during times of dollar depreciation are not new.
Important foreign official purchases appeared in
1986 to 1989 and again in the mid 1990s, times when
the dollar was experiencing depreciation pressures.
However, official purchases accelerated during 2003
and 2004, and are unprecedented in terms of dollar
value and as a share of total financial inflow. These
foreign official purchases are concentrated by hold-
er, with the share of Japanese official holdings in
total estimated official holdings rising from 28 to
37 percent between 2000 and 2004 and the estimated
share of holdings by China and Hong Kong,SAR ris-
ing from 16 to 20 percent of total estimated official
holdings (Fig. 7).
For the United States, the accumulation of current
account deficits yields an increase in the negative net
international investment position, which totaled
$2.4 trillion as of 2003 (direct investment at current
cost).Gross assets (US-owned foreign assets) and lia-
bilities (foreign-owned US assets) are,of course much
larger at $7.2 trillion and $9.6 trillion respectively.
US obligations have several unique features. First,
US international borrowing is mostly in dollar
denominated financial instruments, so a dollar
depreciation reduces the value of the debt. Second,
earnings on US direct investments abroad regularly
have exceeded the returns that foreigners get on
their direct investments in the US.Hence the United
States continues to receive net interest receipts (run-
ning at about $25 billion for 2004) despite having a
negative net investment position.On the other hand,
65 percent of the financial assets held by foreigners
are interest-bearing instruments (including US
Treasury securities) whereas only 45 percent of
financial assets held by US investors abroad bear
interest. This imbalance in financial holdings may
increase the exposure of the United States to rising
interest rates.
Medium-term concerns: Interest rate and exchange
rate vulnerability
The previous sections have outlined the nature of
global macroeconomic imbalances. This section
focuses on potential vulnerabilities that might result
from these imbalances, in particular, to interest rate
and exchange rate changes. I will take as given that
there are upward pressures on global interest rates
and depreciation pressures facing the dollar. These
are not incontrovertible, but seem a plausible direc-
tion to proceed.
The US imbalances to current
account, domestic accounts, and
financial account suggest two
opposing vulnerabilities to rising
interest rates and a depreciating
dollar. On the one hand, the US
negative net international invest-
ment position (and its decompo-
sition into interest-bearing and
non-interest bearing compo-
nents) points to an increased vul-
nerability to rising interest rates.
Higher interest rates should add
net interest payments to the
trade deficit and widen the cur-
rent account deficit (even though
















 DERIVED OFFICIAL HOLDINGS OF US TREASURY SECURITIES
March 2000:
Total Official Holdings = 635.6 billion US$
October 2004:
Total Official Holdings = 1124.7 billion 
US$
Figure 7tive now). But, since most US obligations are dollar-
denominated,a depreciation of the dollar will reduce
the principal value of the obligations. Without a
doubt, all else unchanged, financial payments associ-
ated with higher interest rates would raise the fiscal
deficit (and reduce national savings). On the other
hand, higher interest rates and a depreciated dollar
are likely to reduce the magnitude of the trade deficit
by slowing domestic demand and switching expendi-
ture towards home goods and services and by
increasing demand for exports. On balance, the
United States faces a variety of adjustment chal-
lenges, but they do not go all in the same direction.
For the rest of the world,what kind of vulnerabilities
do other countries face from a depreciating dollar?
In general, the countries that have purchased US
assets are likely to see a capital loss on those assets,
both on account of currency valuation and on
account of lower prices on assets with fixed interest
coupons. At the same time, countries may see a
reduction in exports to the United States, as well as
have the opportunity to buy cheaper imports,associ-
ated with the switch from export-oriented GDP
growth to domestic-demand-based GDP growth. So,
for the countries in surplus and with large holdings
of US assets, the adjustment is (even in the case of
lower import prices) all one-way.
Over the last two years, some countries have started
to absorb some of these changes – breaking up the
co-dependency – and others have not. As noted
already in the discussion of the financial accounts,
some countries have built-up their holdings of US
Treasury securities to a far greater degree than oth-
ers. These foreign official pur-
chases of US assets are reflected
in different rates of appreciation
of individual currencies against
the dollar (Fig. 7) and in differ-
ential responses in the trade
accounts (Fig.3).Currencies that
are traded through liquid private
markets (such as the Canadian
dollar, British pound, Swiss
franc, Australian dollar, and
euro) have appreciated some
20 percent (Canada and Japan)
to 35 percent (euroland) against
the dollar since the beginning of
2002 (when the dollar started a
generalized depreciation). For
currencies that are not traded
widely or in liquid markets (such as the Taiwan dol-
lar, Thai baht, and of course the Chinese renminbi),
official intervention can play an important role in
affecting currency price and their appreciation has
been less or none (China).
Based on the movements in current account bal-
ances, in net exports to the United States, in pur-
chases of US Treasury securities, and in arrested
depreciation against the US dollar, it would seem
that some countries have, if anything, moved toward
increasing their vulnerability to changes in global
interest rates and the exchange value of the dollar.
The rationale for this strategy could be an ‘insurance
policy’ should private markets turn against them
again (as they did in the Asian financial crises).More
generally,the policy choice to limit current apprecia-
tion supports the current economic structure and
sources of growth (that is, exports relative to domes-
tic demand).
Presumably, these policymakers are doing the calcu-
lus to compare the value of economic gains today
against the present-discounted-value of (1) future
losses on the dollar-denominated asset portfolio
should the domestic currency appreciate against the
dollar plus (2) the presumably rising costs of making
real-side adjustments in the source of economic
activity from exports to domestic demand. Given
Their policy strategy, it seems that for them, global
co-dependency continues to make economic sense.
In addition, to the extent that the currencies in the
region are bound together by production strategies
cemented through direct investment they face a col-
lective action problem. If one country unilaterally
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the adjustment 
challenges do not 
all go in the same
direction, for the 
rest of the world, 
the vulnerabilities 
are rising
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breaks out of the currency trend,it bears the brunt of
adjustment in the region.
With the US current account deficit beyond all his-
torical precedent and with the build-up of US assets
in the portfolios of private and official actors, the
dollar should be under significant depreciation pres-
sure and indeed it has depreciated from its trade-
weighted 2002 peak. However, dollar adjustment
alone is unlikely to close the US side of the global
imbalance due to the size of the initial imbalance as
well as to the lop-sided role of consumption. On the
other side, some policymakers abroad, for their own
structural reasons to depend on exports to grow,
have inhibited an appreciation of their currencies
against the dollar,even as others have absorbed sub-
stantial currency change. Overall, US adjustment is
stymied and, potentially worse, rest-of-world imbal-
ances may be concentrated in regions and official
holdings in Asia where there has been the tendency
to limit both exchange rate change and structural
reorienting of demand. Coordinating a collective
move there could aid global internal, external, and
financial adjustment.
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